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Many governments as well as terrorist experts see the use of military and police forces as the only way 
to effectively counter terrorism. The most effective negative sanctions are considered to be military 
strikes, aggressive actions (including kidnapping and killing) against individuals known or suspected 
of being terrorists, or against persons supporting and harboring terrorists. Overt and covert military 
and paramilitary action is also thought advisable to pre-empt and prevent actions by terrorist groups, 
as well as against states suspected of hosting or tolerating terrorists. This paper argues that 
decentralization constitutes a powerful antidote as it strongly reduces the incentives for terrorists to 
attack and because the expected damage suffered is much smaller than in a centralized society. It 
moreover strengthens society, as economic, political and social decentralization (or polycentricity) is an 
essential element of a free and vigorous society. This in turn makes a society less vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks. Indeed, terrorism has no chance of success against a society that actively guards its 
fundamental liberal institutions, of which decentralized decision-making forms an essential part.  
1. FAILURE OF DETERRENCE POLICY AGAINST 
TERRORISM 
1.1. PREDOMINANCE OF COERCIVE RESPONSE 
Governments may react to terrorism in different ways (see, e.g., Schmid and 
Crelinsten, 1993; Lesser et al., 1999). By far the prevailing response to terrorist attacks 
has been coercive military counter-terrorism. This holds, in particular, for today’s 
single world power, the United States, but also for other nations such as Britain 
or Israel. Deterrence is not the same as using brute force (Schelling, 1966; Byman and 
Waxman, 2002). Deterrence involves the threat of damage to an adversary. It is most 
successful when it is not actually carried out. Deterrence leaves the opponent, in 
this case the terrorist group, the option to either desist from future violent 
actions or, if violence is chosen, to be made aware that costs will be imposed. A 
counter-terrorist strategy that aims to kill terrorists under all circumstances 
belongs to a brute force strategy. But the difference between the two is not large 
because deterrence is only credible if it is sometimes used. Indeed, the idea of a 
deterrence strategy is to impose so great a cost on violence that terrorists find the 
expected return on the pursuit of their course no longer adequate. 
Many governments as well as terrorist experts see the use of military and 
police forces as the only way to effectively counter terrorism. They abhor 
making what they consider to be “concessions” to terrorists and rely on threats 
of punishment. The most effective negative sanctions are considered to be 
military strikes, aggressive actions (including kidnapping and killing) against 
individuals known or suspected of being terrorists, or against persons 
supporting and harboring terrorists. Overt and covert military and paramilitary 
action is also thought advisable to pre-empt and prevent actions by terrorist 
groups as well as against states suspected of hosting or tolerating terrorists. 
1.2. CONSEQUENCES OF DETERRENCE POLICY 
1.2.1. Advantages 
The potential benefits of an anti-terrorist policy built on the use of force have 
been widely publicized by those governments employing it and have been 
mentioned above. However, the benefits are difficult to isolate and even more 
difficult to measure, particularly because of possible indirect and long-term 
effects.1 The basic problem is identifying how much worse off (if at all) the 
individuals would have been if a deterrence policy did not exist. To construct 
such a counterfactual situation is problematic, especially as long-run and 
macro-economic and macro-societal effects have to be taken into account. 
1.2.2. Disadvantages 
Some of the costs of employing a deterrence policy are readily apparent and 
measurable (Rathbone and Rowley 2002a,b). 
The first are the direct costs for the country undertaking the deterrence policy. 
Most obvious are the substantial budgetary costs involved in the prevention of a 
terrorist attack, such as border controls and the collection and interpretation of 
information by intelligence agencies. The more aggressive part of the deterrence 
policy relies on the military, police and the various secret services. The total 
number of employees involved and the precise budget costs are difficult or even 
impossible to identify because much of this information is not public knowledge. 
The overall budgetary cost of an anti-terrorist policy is certainly large. 
                                                
1 A survey on measuring the effects of terrorism is provided in Frey and Luechinger (2005) and 
Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer (2007, 2009). 
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A deterrence policy may produce domestic political costs. The question is to what 
extent and for how long the citizens are prepared to support such a policy. 
After some time, citizens become aware that the high costs of a deterrence 
policy displace other government expenditures from which they benefit more 
directly, say for health or retirement benefits. 
By using force, a deterrence policy always runs the risk of resorting to repressive 
means. In the name of the “war on terrorism” constitutional civil and human rights
may be undermined or completely suppressed (Chang, 2002; Cole and Dempsey, 2002). 
These concerns have been frequently discussed in connection with the anti-
terrorist policy adopted by the United States and the United Kingdom after 
September 11, 2001 (see Sterba, 2003; Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2003; Goodin et al., 2005). 
For the citizens concerned, these restrictions on civil and political rights pertain 
to the costs of a deterrence policy. Such a response plays into the hands of the 
terrorists and, if going too far, becomes totally counter-productive. Costs of this 
type arise not only domestically but also internationally. If a country adopting a 
deterrence policy violates the rules which various countries have agreed upon, a 
cumulative worsening of international relationships may take place.  
In order to secure their grip on power, all governments are tempted to exploit 
terrorist attacks to their own advantage. It has been suggested from many sides that 
President Bush used the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 to rally 
support for his “war on terrorism” (e.g., Goodin et al., 2005). Bush was able to 
convince the voters that he represented the will of the nation and that not 
supporting him (and his party) came close to being anti-American. As a result, 
the strict version of deterrence policy adopted by his administration was 
accepted as the only conceivable response to the terrorist attacks. In a well-
functioning democracy in which the checks and balances work well, such 
dealings are part of the process of political competition. Such processes only 
threaten democracy if the government restricts political competition, for 
instance by undermining human and political rights (see above), or by 
hampering the activities of opposition parties and politicians. Democracy can 
also be undermined by a deterrence policy if deviating views are not tolerated 
and are claimed to help the terrorist cause. The coercive nature of deterrence 
policy tends to support such violations of political rights. These costs in terms 
of loss of freedom and political autonomy of the individual have to be 
considered when assessing the costs of a deterrence policy. 
The second type of costs produced by a deterrence policy pertain to its effects 
on terrorists.  
It is generally agreed that complete deterrence is impossible. No country, not 
even one that has the most extensive surveillance and punishment power, is able 
to thwart every conceivable future terrorist activity. Experience has shown that 
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terrorists are capable of innovative responses to deterrence policy. They not only 
seek ever new ways to achieve their goals, but they may also quickly change 
targets and attack those that are impossible or too costly to protect. The costs are 
further raised if terrorists move their attention away from less to more harmful 
and devastating objectives, resulting in more casualties and damage. 
A coercive response tends to reinforce terrorists’ cohesiveness and influence. At the 
same time it exacerbates nationalism and xenophobia in the countries 
associated with the terrorists. There are, thirdly, more general costs involved with 
fighting terrorism by deterrence. 
Deterrence is based on a negative approach: terrorists are threatened with 
punishment if they persist in their activities. Coercive action is answered by 
coercive action. Such interaction tends to degenerate into a negative sum game 
between the parties involved, leaving both of them worse off (see George and 
Simon, 1994; Baldwin, 1999): both the country engaging in the coercive response, 
and also the terrorists lose. Any war, including the proclaimed “war against 
terrorism” is a “dramatically non-zero sum activity” (Schelling, 1984:269). This 
consequence may be the most important argument against relying exclusively 
or even mainly on force to fight terrorism. It is argued here that there is an 
alternative anti-terrorism policy available based on a positive approach.2 Such anti-
terrorist policies tend to evolve into positive sum games: As a result, both 
parties will be better off. 
1.3. INEFFECTIVENESS OF DETERRENCE POLICY 
In the literature on terrorism there is wide agreement that reliance on force as 
anti-terrorism policy is ineffective. One of the leading scholars makes the 
following clear statement:  
“…hardline counter-terrorism policy…does not work” (Wilkinson, 2000:97). 
The use of force is in most cases not only useless in deterring terrorists, but 
successful coercion is sometimes impossible. The U.S. air raids on the home 
and headquarters of Libyan President Gaddafi in 1986 were widely hailed as a 
successful example of anti-terrorist policy using strong military force. Empirical 
analyses of terrorist incidents before and after the raid on Libya do not indicate 
any significant reduction of terrorist activities in which that country was 
involved. After a brief lull, Libya seemed to become even more involved in 
international terrorism. No less than 15 incidents in 1987, and 8 in 1988, have 
been connected to Libya. The most dramatic subsequent event was the 
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland which killed 
                                                
2 See also Bernauer and Ruloff (1999) for positive incentives in non-proliferation policies. 
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278 persons. Of course, this evidence does not necessarily mean that the 
coercive policy failed. There may be various long-term and indirect effects, one 
being that European governments have decided to take strong action against 
possible Libyan terrorists and people supporting them.  
But an econometric analysis using vector-autoregressive intervention techniques 
(Enders and Sandler, 1993) was not able to find any noticeable long-term effect of 
President Reagan’s earlier retaliatory policy designed to curb terrorist attacks 
directed against American interests. What the policy did achieve was that terrorist 
activities were then aimed towards less risky and secured targets rather than the 
heavily fortified embassies and other U.S. installations (Sandler and Lapan, 1988). 
Despite many claims as to its effectiveness, deterrence may even be counter-
productive. Based on a great many cases, this position is supported by many 
scholars. To again quote Wilkinson (2000:115): 
 “There is a widespread misconception that using terror to defeat terror 
will ultimately work. On the contrary, the evidence is that this policy is 
counterproductive.” 
Most observers agree that deterrence is not effective in changing the target 
country’s policy towards terrorism. But it does not follow that coercion should 
not be used to fight terrorism as long as there is no preferable alternative. It 
may be that the other options are even less effective. If this were the case 
deterrence policy would still be advisable (if it was more beneficial than doing 
nothing). A worthwhile evaluation must make an effort to compare the use of 
force (against other / with alternative) anti-terrorist policies. 
2. EFFECTIVENESS OF DECENTRALIZATION IN 
DEALING WITH TERRORISM 
A coercive response that relies on brute force is not the only possible anti-
terrorism policy. The alternative anti-terrorism policies proposed here 
emphasize the advantage of decentralized economic, political and social 
structures as a decentralized society is less vulnerable to terrorist attacks.  
A system composed of many different centers is more stable due to its variety, 
which allows for any part to stand in for another. When one part of the system is 
negatively affected, one or several other parts can take over. Decentralization is 
an effective tool to reduce risk and uncertainty. It reminds of the old saying that 
it is wise “not to put all of your eggs in one basket” (see Dahl and Lindblom, 1953). 
This fundamental insight from the field of socio-biology (see, e.g., Hirshleifer and 
Martinez Coll, 2001) also applies to terrorism. A target’s vulnerability is lower in a 
society composed of many centers rather than in a centralized society. The 
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more centers of power there are in a country, the smaller are the chances that 
terrorists will be able to harm it. In a decentralized system, terrorists do not 
know where to strike, because they are aware that each part can substitute for 
the other, so that a strike is not likely to achieve much. Decentralization thus 
reduces both the probability of terrorists launching an attack and the extent of 
the damage caused in case of an attack. For these two reasons, terrorists have a 
lower incentive to attack decentralized rather than centralized societies.  
In contrast, in a centralized system, most decision-making power with respect 
to the economy, polity and society is located in one place. This central power is 
an ideal target for terrorists, and therefore is in greater danger of being 
attacked. This possibility creates huge costs. If the center is attacked and hit, 
the entire decision-making structure may also collapse and so lead to chaos. In 
addition, there are high costs connected to fending off possible attacks. They 
not only fetter human and material resources, but also promote a bunker 
mentality in the minds of the central power. A ruler may be driven into 
isolation, become subject to “group think,” and lose contact with the people. 
As a result, a gap between the central power and the people emerges, which 
will have bad effects on both sides. In particular, the ruler disregards the 
people’s wishes, as he is afraid of leaving the bunker’s (presumed) security.  
The vulnerability of the two systems to terrorism varies and may be illustrated 
by two examples. 
The attack on the twin towers in New York on September 11, 2001 
represents a triumph for the market as an institution, although it is rarely seen 
in these terms. Though this was the gravest terrorist attack in humankind’s 
history so far, the economic system as a whole was hardly affected. Due to its 
decentralized market economy, the United States’ economy was only very 
marginally hit; the many other centers of economic activity, for example in 
Chicago, Los Angeles, Seattle or Boston, were not directly affected at all. They 
went on functioning without any problem. The estimated damage of 10, 20 or 
even 50 billion dollars is small compared to the US GNP of 10 trillion dollars. 
Even in Manhattan, the recovery was remarkably quick; most parts of the 
financial community were ready to take up work again a few days or even a few 
hours after the attack. This does not, of course, mean that there were no 
human or material losses. But the point is that not even this dreadful blow was 
able to seriously damage a decentralized economy like the American one. Much 
of the high costs incurred were the result of the political response to the attack 
(such as grounding the entire civilian air traffic and closing down the Wall 
Street stock exchange), and not the result of the attack itself. Viewed from this 
perspective, the attack was far from being a victory for the terrorists, but rather 
demonstrated the strength of a decentralized economic system. 
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The Catholic Church with the Pope as absolute, and (in the case of church 
dogma) even infallible, head is an example of a strictly hierarchical, highly 
centralized organization. Nobody can substitute for the Pope. Accordingly, the 
Pope represents an attractive target for terrorists and assassins alike. Indeed, 
there have been several attempts to assassinate the Pope. To some extent, the 
American President who possesses far-reaching powers also is a worthwhile 
target for terrorists and assassins. This position’s vulnerability is mitigated by 
the fact that there exists a well-designed constitution which exactly specifies 
who will replace a president who has been assassinated. There have indeed 
been many attempts to assassinate American presidents, some of which were 
successful. A political system with a committee of equals at the top is much 
less vulnerable. This is, for instance, the case in Switzerland, where the 
government consists of seven members (the Bundesrat), each of whom has 
exactly the same amount of formal power. To attack one, or even several of 
them, would not endanger the stability of the political system. 
That the system indeed works in this manner has been demonstrated by a 
recent incident in Switzerland. In September 2001, a man ran amok (he was not 
a terrorist) in the parliamentary building of the Swiss canton Zug. He shot and 
killed no less than three of the seven members of the government council 
(Regierungsrat), as well as eleven members of parliament. He also injured a 
significant number of other government and parliament members. 
Nevertheless, within a very short period of time, the government was 
functional again, not least because the heads of the partly autonomous 
communes were able to take over. 
A similar incident in Armenia plunged the entire country into a political crisis. 
In October 1999, five gunmen burst into Armenia’s parliament, assassinating 
the Prime Minister, Parliamentary Speaker and seven other government 
officials. Armenia’s Defense Minister stated that the situation created by this 
incident was fraught with uncertainty, and that both the internal and external 
security of the state were in great danger. Because of the centralized nature of 
Armenia’s political system, the killings left a power vacuum. There were no 
people at lower federal levels able to take over. 
The next sections discuss decentralization in the economy, polity, and other 
parts of society. 
2.1. ECONOMIC DECENTRALIZATION 
A market economy is based on an extreme form of decentralization of decision-
making and implementation (Von Hayek, 1978). Indeed, the advantages of the 
market economy as an efficient resource allocation mechanism start to break 
down when it is centralized via oligopolies or monopolies. Under competitive 
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conditions, the suppliers are able to completely substitute each other. Even if 
one of them is incapacitated due to a terrorist attack, the other suppliers are able 
to fill the void immediately. They are prepared, and have an incentive, to step in. 
No special governmental plans have to be set up for such substitution. Of 
course, most economic sectors are not perfectly competitive. But as long as 
there exists some amount of competition, there are always actual or potential 
suppliers who can take over. It follows that the more an economy functions 
according to market principles, the less vulnerable it is to terrorist attacks. 
The strategy of decentralization is immediately applicable to business. Many 
enterprises are faced with immediate or at least potential terrorist threats. This 
applies in particular to firms located in developing countries where local 
terrorism exists (e.g., in South America, Africa, and Asia), but is also important 
for firms in developed countries. If the principal part of an enterprise, most 
importantly headquarters, is located in one prominent building, it offers an 
attractive target to terrorists. If an attack is successful current business may be 
severely disrupted, valuable documents and the contents of computers destroyed, 
and fear and uncertainty may spread among the employees. The ensuing costs 
tend to be out of proportion compared to the rather low cost of an actual attack 
or even of a threat of an attack. In many cases headquarters of large firms are 
landmark buildings, sometimes even “icons.” This makes them even more 
attractive targets to terrorists, especially as one of the major ambitions of most 
terrorists is to receive media attention (Frey, 1988; Frey and Rohner, 2007). 
If headquarters and other important parts of an enterprise are decentralized, 
the terrorists’ destructive task is made much more difficult. They can no longer 
be sure where they should attack, and even if they do, the damage caused will 
be much lower than if the firm had been centralized in one location. In several 
respects, firms already pursue a decentralization strategy. In particular, they 
disperse the safety backups of computer contents in different locations. In the 
case of the terrorist attack against the firms in the New York World Trade 
Center Towers this strategy proved to be very beneficial. 
Decentralization also helps to avoid and reduce the harm done by terrorist 
attacks in the case of monopolistic and oligopolistic sectors of the economy. 
Network industries, such as those for water, electricity or transportation, are 
less vulnerable if sub-units function independently. 
An effective anti-terrorist policy supports economic decentralization and 
competitive structures, as this greatly reduces the country’s vulnerability. 
Obviously, an anti-terrorist policy which concentrates on decentralization 
offers other attractive benefits: it strengthens democracy and liberalism. 
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2.2. POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION 
A second antidote to terrorism is political decentralization. It takes two forms, 
which are outlined below. 
2.2.1. Classical Division of Power 
Political authority is distributed among a number of different political actors. Most 
important is the classical division of power between government, legislature 
and the judicial system. Moreover, the media must be decentralized so that a 
terrorist attack will not threaten the flow of information. It is no accident that 
persons attempting a coup d’état commonly first try to gain control over the 
TV broadcasting station. However, if there exist several different TV 
broadcasting stations and these are located in many different places, this effort 
will be doomed to fail. Also, the public administration should have at least 
some measure of independence, as it needs to be able to act when a terrorist 
attack is imminent. This applies in particular to the police, the secret service, 
and the military. Public bureaucracy is further insulated against terrorism when 
it itself is decentralized. 
A centralized organization will invite attacks by terrorists, partly because of its 
functions, but also partly because of its symbolic value. Thus, the planned 
concentration of the European Union’s bureaucracy in one location in Brussels 
is likely to have a counter-productive effect on security. Any such building 
would be a particularly attractive target for terrorists. While it may be less 
costly to control and secure the sole access to such a building than it would be 
if the offices were widely dispersed, an actual or even suspected terrorist attack 
could still result in huge costs. If, for instance, it were suspected that terrorists 
had planted a bomb in the building, work would grind to a halt and all 
employees would need to be evacuated. This applies even for false alarms; so 
when public administration is centralized, the costs imposed by terrorist threats 
turn out to be very substantial.  
In many countries, other actors also enjoy considerable independence. Most 
prominent is the central bank that has the power to pursue whichever 
monetary policy it sees fit. But there are also regulatory authorities that enjoy a 
degree of independence from other political decision-makers. The reasons for 
such (partial) independence are based on considerations that have nothing to 
do with terrorism. In many countries, central bank independence has been 
established because it is expected that such an organization will adopt a more 
long-run-oriented policy than governments. The latter are (usually every four 
years) subject to reelection pressures, inducing them to produce short-term 
political business cycles that work in their own favor. But such a degree of 
independence turns out to be an effective means of lowering the vulnerability 
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to terrorist threats. This effect is strengthened when the central bank itself is 
decentralized, as is the case for the American Federal Reserve, which is 
composed of various central banks located in a number of cities. 
2.2.2. Spatial Decentralization 
Political power can also be divided between various levels of government. In 
federal (i.e., spatially decentralized) countries, there are the federal, 
state/provincial/cantonal, and communal levels. In some countries, there also 
exists a fourth, regional level between communes and provinces (see, e.g., Bird, 1986; 
Oates, 1991). It is possible to go one step further by granting far-reaching 
autonomy to functional, overlapping and competing jurisdictions, or FOCJ.3 As 
each of these jurisdictions extends over a different area and is governed by an 
independent political body, such a system is quite immune to terrorist attacks. 
The high population density typical for large urban areas makes them ideal 
targets for terrorists and other aggressors. Studies (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002) 
suggest indeed that there is a statistical link between terrorism and 
urbanization, though they were only able to identify a weak relationship. 
A spatial decentralization of the population is of special importance in cases 
where terrorists use biological and chemical weapons. In areas of high 
population density, viruses (such as smallpox) introduced by terrorists may 
spread quickly, leading to many casualties within a short period of time. The 
risk of this is not as pronounced when people do not live so closely together. 
Strengthening political decentralization via the division of power and 
federalism strongly contributes to a country being less vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks. The attraction for terrorists to take aggressive action is diminished. 
2.3. SOCIAL DECENTRALIZATION 
Having many centers of power can extend beyond the economy and polity. 
Other forms of social groups can also be more or less centralized. There are 
many bodies, such as NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations), clubs and 
corporations, which are able to function well in a decentralized way. Networks 
between firms without any hierarchical structure have become increasingly 
important. As the example of Linux has shown, completely decentralized open 
source systems are just as efficient, if not more efficient, than a hierarchical 
firm, such as Microsoft is in the production of the same type of software. 
More important than the actual decentralization of particular organizations, is 
the effort to guarantee that many different decision-making systems operate in 
a society. In a totalitarian system, almost everything is dictated by a ruler (and 
                                                
3 The concept of multiple, overlapping federal units is explored in Frey and Eichenberger (1999). 
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may include which school one attends, whom one marries, which job one 
takes, and where one spends one’s holidays), so making it most vulnerable to 
attacks from the inside and outside. In contrast, a liberal society is 
characterized by the coexistence of many different decision-making systems: 
the market, democracy, bargaining, bureaucracy and tradition. Such variety 
strengthens stability in case of a terrorist attack. 
3. CAN DECENTRALIZATION BE UPHELD? 
Decentralized economic, political and other social structures have three 
important beneficial effects with respect to terrorist threats: 
 A target becomes less attractive to terrorists; 
 Each of the units is better able to solve its problems. This makes it 
more unlikely that a terrorist threat will arise in the first place. A good 
example is provided by the Alto Adige (or South Tyrol) in Italy. For 
many years, it was plagued by terrorist activities, which substantially 
hindered its economic development. In particular, tourism was 
negatively affected. The Italian Senate’s law, according far-reaching 
rights of autonomy to the region, almost certainly prevented a major 
eruption of terrorist violence between the Italian-speaking and 
German-speaking communities living in that region. Similarly, the 
greater degree of autonomy granted to Puerto Rico by the United 
States reduced political violence on this island. A study, undertaken by 
the World Bank (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001) for a combined cross-section 
and time series of 161 countries over the period from 1960 to 1999, 
presents indirect evidence that decentralization may help to prevent 
internal violence. On the basis of 78 civil wars analyzed, it is shown that 
strongly ethnically fractionalized (and in that respect decentralized) 
societies have a much lower risk of experiencing war-like internal 
conflicts than homogenous societies. 
 Each of the units is better able to react and to reorganize itself in case 
a terrorist attack occurs.  
These are important reasons why liberal democracies in the western world 
have been remarkably resilient to terrorism.  
Yet, when a country is faced with terrorism, there is an overwhelming urge to 
centralize decision-making powers (see Wilkinson, 2000). This tendency is 
particularly strong when a country has been subjected to a dramatic terrorist 
act. The advantages of decentralization are then completely disregarded. An 
example is the United States. The American mega-merger of various bodies 
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into the new Department of Homeland Security with 169,000 employees, in 
this respect, is a move in the wrong direction. Any terrorist group able to attack 
this Department, either by the use of weapons (including biological and 
chemical agents) or by interfering with its electronic systems, could cause 
considerable damage. The fact that the centralization of units makes them 
more vulnerable has been demonstrated by the two terrorist attacks on New 
York’s twin towers. The first attack in 1993 destroyed a principal command 
center of the police force and other support units. Nevertheless, the Mayor of 
New York, Rudolph Giuliani, ordered the establishment of a new central 
Office of Emergency Management in a building next to the World Trade 
Center. On September 11, 2001, this Office, which was intended to coordinate 
all police and support units in the event of a catastrophe, including terrorist 
attacks, was again destroyed and proved to be useless. But such reactions can 
also be observed in many other countries. When Italy and Germany faced 
menacing terrorist activities from the Brigate Rosse and the Rote Armee Fraktion, 
strongly centralized structures for anti-terrorist policy were established.  
Why does such a centralizing policy reaction occur, despite the fact that it 
may be counterproductive? Two reasons may be adduced. 
(1) In the case of an imminent or actual terrorist attack, the government 
is forced to take some quick and forceful action. Deterrence policy 
incorporating centralization meets this criterion. A “strong central 
command” in the short term seems to be an effective policy against the 
terrorists. In contrast, a decentralizing policy takes longer to become 
effective. The voters on whom the government in a democracy depends 
are less likely to attribute the positive effects of decentralization – the 
lower vulnerability – to the government’s actions. At best, they notice 
that there are fewer and less dangerous terrorist attacks than elsewhere. 
(2) Government politicians and public bureaucrats exploit the special 
situation created by terrorist threats to extend their own competencies. 
To possess the command over increased budgets and more resources 
enlarges their importance in society.  
A polycentric policy is therefore not easy to achieve as a reaction to terrorism. 
It is a long-term strategy, having the best chance of being implemented when a 
terrorist danger is not imminent. It cannot be left solely to a government that 
depends on short-run electoral success. Long-term anti-terrorist policy through 
decentralization must be written into a country’s constitution. The political 
actors – parliament, government, public bureaucracy and the courts – must be 
given the task to secure existing polycentric structures, and to expand them 
wherever possible. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
Decentralizing the economy, the polity, and other social institutions is certainly 
not a panacea to “solve” the problem of terrorism. However, decentralization 
constitutes a powerful antidote as it strongly reduces the incentives for 
terrorists to attack and because the expected damage suffered is much smaller 
than in a centralized society. It moreover strengthens society, as economic, 
political and social decentralization (or polycentricity) is an essential element of 
a free and vigorous society. This in turn makes a society less vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks. Indeed, terrorism has no chance of success against a society 
that actively guards its fundamental liberal institutions, of which decentralized 
decision-making forms an essential part. 
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